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MORE ADO ABOUT MERGERS: BROWN SHOE CO. V.
UNITED STATES
BACKGROUND
Mergers have played a most important part in the growth of many of
today's giant corporations. The high point of the merger movement in the
United States occurred around the turn of the century, and was marked by
the foundation of such huge concentrations of economic power as United
States Steel and American Tobacco.' The extent to which mergers facilitated
acquisition of market control by one or a few firms led to legislative attempts
to stem the tide. In 1914 Congress enacted the original Section 7 of the
Clayton Act which prohibited the acquisition by one corporation of the
stock of another corporation where such acquisition would result in a sub-
stantial lessening of competition between the acquiring and the acquired
companies or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. 2
In 1926 the Supreme Court held that the act did not prohibit the
acquisition by one corporation of the assets of another, but only applied to
stock purchases.3 Perhaps as a result of this decision, the number of corporate
mergers increased tremendously between 1926 and 1930, 4 During the depres-
sion this trend declined, but the beginning of the Second World War marked
a new burst of merger activity which still continues. 5
In the opinion of the Federal Trade Commission, and of many members
of Congress, the prohibitions of Section 7 of the Clayton Act as originally
enacted were not sufficient to cope with the problems presented by the
merger movement. As a result, Congress was repeatedly asked to revise
section 7, and a large number of bills to this effect were introduced. In 1950
Congress amended section 7 and in so doing broadened its applicability. The
amended act reads as follows: 6
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or in-
directly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital .
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line
of. commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such ac-
quisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to'
create a monopoly.
It should be clear from the wording of the statute that for a violation
to exist, it is not necessary that competition already be substantially
lessened, or that a monopoly already be created. It is only necessary that
the court find that the merger may lead to the prohibited result, and that
a substantial lessening of competition is a probable consequence of the
merger. In section 7 the standards of the Sherman Act were rejected in favor
1 Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
Harv. L. Rev. 226, 229 (1960).
2 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
3 FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
4 .Supra note 1, at 230.
5 Ibid.
6 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended by 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. 1 18 (1958).
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of one which was intended to reach monopolistic tendencies "in their in-
cipiency and well before they have attained such effects as would justify a
Sherman Act proceeding." 7 However, thorny problems arise when the courts
attempt to determine just where the line should be drawn. "Unfortunately,
as any economist would concede, there is no ascertainable magic size or
number of firms which divides competition from oligopoly or any other less
desirable form of market behavior."8
In 1962 the United States Supreme Court first came fully to grips with
the amended section 7 in the case of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States .°
The purpose of this comment is to examine the present state of the law
under section 7 in the light of the Brown Shoe opinion.
BROWN SHOE
In 1955 the Justice Department brought suit to prevent the Brown
Shoe Company, Inc. from merging with the G. R. Kinney Company, Inc.
A motion by the Government for a preliminary injunction was denied, and
the companies were allowed to merge on the condition that their operations
be kept separate. 1 ° As of 1955 Brown was the fourth leading manufacturer
of shoes, turning out about four per cent of the nation's total shoe produc-
tion." Kinney was the twelfth largest shoe manufacturer, and was the oper-
ator of the largest family style shoe store chain in the United States. These
stores made about 1.2 per cent of all national retail shoe sales by dollar
volume.' 2
 Brown also owned or controlled a large number of retail outlets.
Over 1,230 stores were either owned outright by Brown or independently
operated under agreements which precluded the sale of lines which competed
with those manufactured by Brown.' 3
 Kinney's manufacturing plants supplied
about twenty per cent of the shoes sold in Kinney stores. Before the merger
Kinney bought no shoes from Brown. However, after the merger Brown
became the largest outside supplier of shoes to Kinney, supplying 7.9 per
cent of its needs.' 4
The Supreme Court found that the shoe industry was dominated by a
small number of large companies. The top four companies produced ap-
proximately twenty-three per cent of the nation's shoes. Further, a definite
trend toward acquiring retail outlets was found to exist among the larger
shoe manufacturers. Brown, for example, had owned no retail outlets before
1951, and had acquired 845 stores by 1956. Between 1950 and 1956 nine
independent shoe store chains, operating 1,114 retail stores, were found to
have been acquired by the largest manufacturing firms in the industry. After
acquiring retail outlets, shoe manufacturers showed a definite tendency to sup-
ply an ever increasing proportion of the retail outlets' needs, "thereby fore-
closing other manufacturers from effectively competing for the retail accounts.
7
 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 n.32 (1962), quoting S. Rep. No.
1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess, 7-8 (1950).
8 Bok, supra note I, at 243.
0
 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
10 Id. at 296.
11 Id. at 302-03.
12 Ibid.
13 Id. at 297.
14 Id. at 304.
160
STUDENT COMMENTS
Manufacturer-dominated stores were found to be 'drying up' the available
outlets for independent producers."'s The Court found that Brown was not
only a participant but also a "moving factor" in these industry trends. 18
In the District Court the merger was held to be unlawful, and Brown
was ordered to dispose of its interest in Kinney." In affirming the decision
of the District Court the United States Supreme Court held that the merger
violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act both in its vertical's and in its hori-
zontaP° aspects. The merger was vertical in that the manufacturing facilities
of Brown were combined with Kinney's retail stores, and horizontal in that
the retail outlets of the two companies were combined. The combination of
the manufacturing facilities of the two companies was not discussed in the
Supreme Court opinion since the District Court had found that it did not
come within the prohibitions of section 7, and the Government had not ap-
pealed.2°
In passing on the validity of the merger the Court first made a careful
examination of the legislative history of the 1950 amendment. It found
that "the dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the 1950
amendments was a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of eco-
nomic concentration in the American economy." 21
 A number of factors which
Congress had considered relevant in judging the validity of a given merger
were then discussed. 22
 In applying these factors to the Brown-Kinney merger
the Court examined its vertical and horizontal aspects separately.
15 Id. at 301.
10 Id. at 302.
37 United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Mo. 1959).
18
 370 U.S. at 334. "Economic arrangements between companies standing in a
supplier-customer relationship arc characterized as 'vertical.' The primary vice of a
vertical merger or other arrangement tying a customer to a supplier is that, by foreclosing
the competitors of either party from a segment of the market otherwise open to them,
the arrangement may act as a 'clog on competition' ... which `deprivers] . rivals of a
fair opportunity to compete'. . . . Every extended vertical arrangement by its very nature,
for at least a time, denies to competitors of the supplier the opportunity to compete
for part or all of the trade of the customer-party to the vertical arrangement." Id. at
323-24.
12
 Id. at 346. "An economic arrangement between companies performing similar
functions in the production or sale of comparable goods or services is characterized as
`horizontal'. . . . Where the arrangement effects a horizontal merger between companies
occupying the same product and geographic market, whatever competition previously
may have existed in that market between the parties to the merger is eliminated." Id.
at 334-35.
20 Id. at 335.
21 Id. at 315.
22 First, that Congress intended to "plug the loophole" and extend the act to cover
asset acquisitions. Second, that since the phrase "between the acquiring and the acquired
companies" had been removed by the amendment, section 7 was to apply not only to
mergers between actual competitors, but also to vertical and conglomerate mergers.
Third, that Congress was primarily interested in retarding the process of concentration
in American industry, and that section 7 was intended to give the courts the power to
halt this trend at the outset before it gathered momentum. Fourth, that Congress had
rejected the standards of the Sherman Act in section 7 cases. Fifth, that the beneficial
effect of some mergers had been recognized, as where two small firms merge in order
to be better able to compete with the larger firms in the industry, or where a failing
company merges with one which is a healthy competitor. The Court found that the
legislative history showed congressional concern with competition, not competitors, and
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In each case a careful delineation of the relevant market was first made,
as to both product and geographic location. This is a necessary predicate to
any analysis of the competitive effect of a merger, since its effects must be
tested • in the market within which the companies operate. Section 7 pro-
scribes mergers where they "may substantially lessen competition in any line
of commerce in any section of the country." Therefore, both the product
line in question (line of commerce) and the geographic market (section of
the country) must be defined by the court in order to bring the competitive
effect of the merger into proper focus."
For the purpose of examining the vertical aspect of the merger the
relevant geographic market was held to be the entire Nation. 24 The position
of the Government was that the relevant product market (line of commerce)
was "footwear," or alternatively ."men's," "women's" and "children's" shoes
considered separately. Brown argued that in order to properly define the
relevant lines of commerce further distinctions were necessary. The age and
sex of intended customers were important, but differences in grade of ma-
terial, quality of workmanship, and customer use of shoes were felt to be
equally important." Brown sought to have the line of commerce divided
into ten separate age/sex categories.2° These age/sex categories were to be
further broken down into a multitude of subdivisions based on price, quality
and use differences. Brown maintained that its classification by age, sex and
use was supported by the fact that shoes are generally so classified by manu-
facturers." Its further subdivision by price and quality was based on the
contention that since Brown shoes were primarily medium priced, and
Kinney shoes were low priced, they were not being sold in competition with
each other, and should therefore be separate "lines of commerce" for the
purpose of measuring the competitive effect of the merger. 28
The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's finding that the rele-
vant product market was men's, women's and children's shoes. Its decision
was based on the following considerations: (1) these product lines are
recognized by the public as being separate; (2) the lines are manufactured in
separate plants; (3) "each has characteristics peculiar to itself rendering it
generally noncompetitive with the others; and each is, of course, directed
its desire to restrain mergers only to the extent that such combinations may tend to
lessen competition. Sixth, that no particular test was adopted for measuring the relevant
market, nor was any definition of the word "substantially" adopted. Seventh, that while
"substantially to lessen competition" was not defined, Congress did indicate that an
analysis of the industry must be made in order to determine whether or not a tendency
toward concentration existed. Eighth, that the words "may tend to substantially lessen
competition" were used to show that Congress was concerned with "probabilities, not
certainties," and that mergers were to be proscribed if probable anticompetitive effect
could be shown. Id. at 317-23.
23 United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1947).
24 370 U.S. at 328.
25 Brief for the Appellant, pp. 127-36, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 9.
26 Id. at 129.
27 "The district court's point with regard to shoe classification is not well taken
and is unrealistic since the undisputed evidence in the record shows that shoes are
classified by manufacturers in categories which correspond to the intended use for which
they are to be put as well as on age/sex and price/quality basis." Id. at 127.
28 Id. at 129-36.
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toward a distinct class of customers."2° The Court minimized the significance
of Brown's contention that medium-priced shoes do not compete with low-
priced shoes. Further age/sex distinctions were rejected, since Brown manu-
factured and Kinney sold about the same percentage of the suggested sub-
divisions as they did of men's, women's and children's shoes, and any further
subdivision would not aid the Court in analyzing the effect's of the merger."
In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Clark maintained that the proper product
market was "shoes of all types." 3 ' Mr. Justice Harlan, in an opinion which
dissented as to the Court's jurisdiction but concurred as to the merits of
the case, agreed with Mr. Justice Clark as to the proper product market. 32
After defining the relevant market in which the effects of the vertical
merger were to be measured, the Court went on to determine what these
effects in fact were. The first factor to be examined was the size of the share
of the market which was foreclosed by the merger. However, this in itself
was not felt to be decisive." The Court held that an examination of "various
economic and historical factors" was also necessary in order ,to determine
whether the merger was illegal. One of the most important of these factors
was "the very nature and purpose of the arrangement." 34
 Congress was
found to have contemplated that "the tests of illegality [under section 7]
are intended to be similar to those which the courts have applied in inter-
preting the same language as used in other sections of the Clayton Act." 38
Section 3 of the Clayton Act has virtually the same wording as section 7. 30
Section 3 has been found to require an examination of the "interdependence
of the market share foreclosed by, and the economic purpose of, the vertical
arrangement."37
 As is the case under section 3, the Court found that the
size of the market share involved, the purpose of the arrangement, and the
presence or absence of a trend toward concentration in the industry were
relevant to determining the legality of a merger under section 7.38 Turning
29 370 U.S. at 326.
30 Id. at 327.
31
 Id. at 356. "It would appear that the relevant line of commerce would be shoes
of all types. This is emphasized by the nature of Brown's manufacturing activity and its
plan to integrate the Kinney stores into its operations. The competition affected thereby
would be in the line handled by these stores which is the full line of shoes manufactured
by Brown. This conclusion is more in keeping with the record as I read it and at the
same time avoids the charge of splintering the product line."
32 Id. at 366.
33 Id. at 328.
34 Id. at 329.
35 Ibid.
36
 It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods for use, consumption,
or resale within the United States . . . on the condition, agreement, or understanding
that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods ... of a com-
petitor or competitors of the • . • seller where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract
for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. 38 Stat. 731 (1914),
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958). Cf. text accompanying note 6, supra.
37 370 U.S. at 329.
36 "We reach this conclusion because the trend toward vertical integration in the
shoe industry, when combined with Brown's avowed policy of forcing its own shoes
upon its retail subsidiaries, may foreclose competition from a substantial share of the
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to the facts of the Brown-Kinney merger the Court stated that "in this
industry, no merger between a - manufacturer and an independent retailer
could involve a larger potential market forecIosure." 39 Further, the evidence
disclosed that Brown intended to use its ownership of Kinney to force
Brown shoes into Kinney stores. 4° The recent tendency among large shoe
manufacturers to acquire retail outlets was found to show the existence of
a trend toward vertical integration in the industry." On the basis of these
findings the merger was found to foreclose competition from a substantial
share of the national market for men's, women's and children's shoes, and was
therefore held to violate section 7.
Mr. Justice Clark appeared to agree with the majority as to the
standard of illegality for measuring the effects of the merger. 4 " Mr. Justice
Harlan felt that the size of the market share which was foreclosed by the
merger, combined with its purpose, was enough to render it illega1.43 He
reached this result without considering the existence of a trend toward con-
centration in the industry, which he felt had not been proved. 44
The Brown-Kinney merger was horizontal in that it combined the
retail outlets of the two companies, thus ending such competition as had
previously existed between them. In examining the horizontal aspects of
the merger the Court used the same product market as had been used for
its consideration of the vertical aspects, i.e., men's, women's and children's
shoes.41
 However, in defining the geographic market it took a new and
different approach. The Supreme Court agreed with the District Court's
finding that the horizontal aspects of the merger must be analyzed "in every
city with a population exceeding 10,000 and its immediate contiguous sur-
rounding territory in which both Brown and Kinney sold shoes at retail
through stores they either owned or controlled." 4 ° This definition meant that
less than one half of the cities where either Brown or Kinney sold shoes
were included in the scope of the geographic market. 47 Mr. Justice Clark48
felt that the relevant geographic market for measuring the effect of the
merger should be the nation as a whole.
In determining the competitive effect of the merger the Court first
discussed the size of the combined market share of Brown and Kinney in
the relevant markets. In thirty-two cities their combined market share of
women's shoes exceeded twenty per cent. Their share of the market for
markets for men's, women's and children's shoes, without producing any countervailing
competitive, economic, or social advantages." Id. at 334.




42 Id. at 356.
43 Id. at 372-73.
44 reach this result without considering the findings of the District Court re-
specting the trend in the shoe industry towards 'oligopoly' and vertical integration. The
statistics in the record fall short of convincing me that any such trend exists." Id. at
373-74.
45 Id. at 336.
4 ° Id. at 337.
47 Id. at 338.
48 Id. at 356.
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children's shoes exceeded twenty per cent in thirty-one cities. In 118 cities
the combined shares of Brown and Kinney exceeded five per cent in the sale
of one of the relevant product lines.'" ) The decision stressed the importance of
the size of the market share which the companies may control by merging."
In an industry as fragmented as shoe retailing, the control of
substantial shares of the trade in a city may have important effects
on competition. If a merger achieving 5 percent control were now
approved, we might be required to approve future merger efforts
by Brown's competitors seeking similar market shares. The oligopoly
Congress sought to avoid would then be furthered and it would be
difficult to dissolve the combinations previously approved.
Other factors which could be considered in evaluating the merger were
also discussed. The Court again mentioned the history of the tendency
toward concentration in the industry, and also spoke of the absence of
mitigating factors, such as the business failure of one of the parties to the
merger." However, on the whole, the horizontal aspect of the merger seems
to have been condemned wholly on the basis of the size of the market share
which the merged companies controlled.
THE RELEVANT MARKET
The problem of defining the relevant market in which the competitive
effect of a merger is to be measured is basic to every section 7 case. How-
ever, the great variety of products which are produced by American com-
panies, combined with a great variation in the size and character of the
geographic markets within which they do business, makes it impossible to
set up a universal standard for determining market limits. The boundaries
of a given market can only be set after a careful examination of the industry
in question. But, as is always the case when courts must make broad in-
vestigations of economic data, serious problems arise as to the relevancy of
certain factors.
Perhaps the most important problem relating to market definition is
the relevance of the existence of products which are "reasonably inter-
changeable" substitutes for the items produced by the merging firms. 52
This is best illustrated by an examination of the Cellophane53 case, which is
the leading decision in point. This was an action against duPont Company
under the Sherman Act alleging that duPont had monopolized trade in the
manufacture of cellophane. The Court did not accept the position of the
Government and took the view that the product market included not only
49 Id. at 343.
50 Id. at 343-44.
51 At the same time appellant has presented no mitigating factors, such as the
business failure or the inadequate resources of one of the parties that may have pre-
vented it from maintaining its competitive position, nor a demonstrated need for com-
bination to enable small companies to enter into a more meaningful competition with
those dominating the relevant markets." Id. at 346.
52 For an excellent discussion of this problem see Mann & Lewyn, The Relevant
Market Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Two New Cases—Two Different Views,
47 Va. L. Rev. 1015 (1961).
53 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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cellophane, but all "flexible packaging materials." Had the product market
been limited to cellophane the decision would probably have been adverse to
duPont, since it controlled 68 percent of the market. With "flexible packaging
materials" as the line of commerce duPont did not have a monopoly since it
controlled less than _20 percent of the relevant market. One of the most
important elements in determining the "reasonable interchangeability" of
products, or the "cross-elasticity of demand" between them is the responsive-
ness of the sales of one product to price changes in the other. As the Court
said in Cellophane, "If a slight decrease in the price of cellophane causes
a considerable number of customers of other flexible wrappings to switch to
cellophane, it would be an indication that a high cross-elasticity of demand
exists between them; that the products compete in the same market."54 The
"reasonable interchangeability" concept seems to have been generally ac-
cepted in subsequent cases. But in the duPont-General Motors" case, which
was decided under the original section 7, the Supreme Court did not discuss
the concept of "reasonable interchangeability." It answered the contention
of the defense that the product market should be all industrial sales of
finishes and fabrics with the statement that "automotive finishes and fabrics
have sufficient peculiar characteristics and uses to constitute them as products
sufficiently distinct from all other finishes and fabrics to make them a 'line
of commerce' within the meaning of the Clayton Act." 56
 The fact that the
Court refused (or neglected) to use the language of the Cellophane case has
led the Government to maintain that the "reasonable interchangeability"
doctrine was impliedly rejected. This approach seems to have recently met
with judicial approval." However, Brown Shoe appears to settle the question.
Citing Cellophane, the Court states that "the outer boundaries of a product
market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the
cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for
it."58
 This seems to be a reasonable conclusion, since however difficult a full
examination of market alternatives may be, it is a necessary predicate to an
honest evaluation of the competitive situation in a given line of commerce.
The facts of the Cellophane case bear witness to the relevancy of such an
inquiry and also show how exceedingly important it can be to the defense.
When the Brown Shoe opinion is examined it appears that although
the Court defined the relevant product market as men's, women's and chil-
dren's shoes, it could as easily have defined it as "footwear," as was suggested
by the concurring opinions." In explaining its reasons for making these
product distinctions the Court first affirms that the broad product market
is to be determined through "reasonable interchangeability" and possibly
"production flexibility."60 It then declares that "within this broad market,
well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product
markets for anti-trust purposes . . . . Because Section 7 of the Clayton Act
54 Id. at 400.
'5 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
58 Id. at 592.
57 Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 813 (9th Cir. 1961).
58 370 U.S, at 325.
55 See text accompanying notes 31 and 32 supra.
51) See text accompanying notes 69 and 70 infra.
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prohibits any merger which may substantially lessen competition 'in any
line of commerce' [emphasis supplied], it is necessary to examine the
effects of a merger in each such economically significant submarket to deter-
mine if there' is a reasonable probability that the merger will substantially
lessen competition." 64 While "footwear" may have been the broadest scope
of the market in the present case, the Court seems to have felt that the
product markets chosen by the District Court were sufficiently well defined
submarkets to constitute "lines of commerce" in and of themselves. There-
fore, since the merger was found to tend to substantially lessen competition
in each of these "lines of commerce," it was held to be illegal. This holding
by the Supreme Court seems to mean that if any merger tends to substantially
lessen competition in any relevant submarket it will be illegal even if com-
petition is not lessened in other submarkets or in the broad market as a
whole."
The boundaries of submarkets may be defined "by examining such
practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a
separate 'economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses,
unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity
to price changes and specialized vendors."" These statements imply that
a broad definition of the total market will avail the defense nothing if the
Government can point out a relevant submarket to the court within which
competition is substantially foreclosed. They also imply that the Court
may be willing to allow such submarkets to be rather narrowly defined.
Such an approach will make it much easier for the Government to pinpoint
its markets in order to show maximum competitive injury. However, the
manipulation of market data by the Government should not be substituted
for a careful analysis of the economic realities of the situation. 84 As we have
seen, market definition is crucial in this area. To allow the Government
to define its markets at will is not only to perhaps ignore economic realities,
it is to deprive the defendant of what is often his only hope of success.
Beyond the concept of "reasonable interchangeability" lies that of
"production flexibility." In a number of cases it has been contended that
where the manufacturers of the product which the Government has chosen
as the "line of commerce" have the facilities to easily shift production to
other items, these other items should be included in the relevant product
market. This approach was taken by the Court in United States v. Columbia
Steel Co.," which was a suit under the Sherman Act to enjoin United States
01 370 U.S. at 325.
02 See summary of address by Lee Loevinger to the Anti-Trust Section of the A.B.A.
reported in CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 50,154 (Current Comment).
03 370 U.S. at 325.
64 "Government trial counsel of late have been increasingly frank about their
manipulations of market data. In one ,case, when it suits their purpose to narrow the
market, they will argue that the doctrine of ,reasonable interchangeability is immaterial.
In another, when they desire to broaden the market to transmute what appears to be
a conglomerate diversification into a horizontal acquisition between competitors, they
do not hesistate to rely on the very same doctrine." Handler & Robinson, A Decade of the
Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 649
(1961).
65 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
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Steel Company, the nation's largest steel manufacturer, from acquiring the
Consolidated Steel Corporation, a large purchaser of steel products. The
Government alleged that the acquisition was an illegal restraint of trade
because all manufacturers except United States Steel would be excluded
from supplying steel products to Consolidated. In defining the product
market the Court made the following observations: "if rolled steel pro-
ducers can make other products as easily as plates and shapes, then the
effect of the removal of Consolidated's demand for plates and shapes must
be measured not against the market for plates and shapes alone, but for
all comparable rolled products." 66 If rolled steel producers could make
other products interchangeably with shapes and plates the potential injury
to competition should not be measured by considering the total demand
for shapes and plates alone, but rather by comparing Consolidated's demand
for rolled steel products with the demand for all comparable rolled steel
products in the Consolidated marketing area a7 In United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp. "production flexibility" was rejected as being irrelevant in a
section 7 proceeding." The same position was taken by the 9th Circuit in
Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC." Brown Shoe indicates that "production
flexibility" may be relevant in a section 7 proceeding, at least insofar as
vertical mergers are concerned. In a footnote the Court cites Columbia Steel
and states that "the cross-elasticity of production facilities may also be an
important factor in defining a product market within which a vertical merger
is to be viewed."" However, it is observed that the findings of the District
Court are not sufficient to show that such "production flexibility" actually
exists.71
It is interesting to note that in his separate opinion Mr. Justice Harlan
relied heavily on the "production flexibility" factor in his definition of the
product market. After first noting that a single shoe factory may easily
manufacture varying grades of shoes, and can without difficulty shift from
the production of men's shoes to those of women or children, he stated: 72
Because of this flexibility of manufacture, the product market with
respect to the merger between Brown's manufacturing facilities and
Kinney's retail outlets might more accurately be defined as the
complete wearing-apparel shoe market, combining in one the three
components which the District Court treated as separate lines of
commerce. Such an analysis, taking into account the interchange-
ability of production, would seem a more realistic gauge of the
8° Id. at 508.
67
 Ibid.
08 "While the steel producers may be able to shift their production from one product
to another, the buyers obviously cannot so shift their purchases. A user of steel sheets
cannot make do with bars, rods, pipe or plates. The only flexibility the buyer has is in
the choice of the company from which he buys the product he needs. It is just such
freedom of choice that Section 7 is designed to protect and for that reason line of
commerce must take into account buyers and uses." United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 592 n.34 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
08 Supra note 57, at 813.
7° 370 U.S. at 325 n.42.
71 Ibid.
72 Id. at 367.
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possible anticompetitive effects in the shoe manufacturing in-
dustry of a merger between a shoe manufacturer and a retailer than
the District Court's compartmentalization in terms of the buying
public.
In advocating the relevance of "production flexibility" in defining the
product market, Mr. Justice Harlan seems to be stressing the effects which
the merger will have on other shoe manufacturers. The majority appears to
be more concerned with the interests of consumers. If the prime concern
is to be with consumers, the fact that other manufacturers may shift to
different product lines does not seem to be relevant." With fewer firms in
the market injury to consumers is apt to be more, not less, and the only
parties who may benefit by the existence of such "production flexibility"
are rival firms. Competitors may easily sell a different product line, but
consumers will still be forced to buy the "line of commerce" in question in
a market where competition may be disappearing. It is submitted that con-
sumers of shoes will not benefit because shoe manufacturers can easily shift
production to saddles.
'MEASURING COMPETITIVE EFFECTS
Once the boundaries of the relevant market have been set it then be-
comes necessary to determine the effects which a merger will have on com-
petition within that market. Section 7 proscribes such mergers as "may
73 Cf. supra note 68. In Crown Zellerbach the court showed its almost exclusive
concern with competitors of the merged firms. The court first stated that growth through
mergers might enable a company to effect economies which would enable it to offer
its goods to consumers at lower prices. It then stated that
that might well be a positive benefit to ultimate consumers. It is plain however
from the Act and its legislative history that concern with such considerations was
no part of the Congressional thought. Congress was not concerned about in-
creased efficiency; it was concerned about the competitor—the small business
man whose 'little, independent units are gobbled up by bigger ones,' and about
other competitors whose opportunities to meet the prices of the larger concern
and hence compete with it might be diminished by a merger which increased
the concentration of power in the large organization. Thus the House Report
described as one of the unlawful effects which the legislation was designed to
avoid an 'increase in the relative size of the enterprise making the acquisition
to such a point that its advantage over its competitors threatens to be decisive.'
296 F.2d at 825. It is interesting to compare the language used in Brown Shoe. In
speaking of the legislative history the Court declared that "Taken as a whole, the
legislative history illuminates Congressional concern with the protection of competition,
not competitors, and its desire to restrain mergers only to the extent that such combina-
tions may tend to lessen competition," 370 U.S. at 320. Further, "of course, some of the
results of large integrated or chain operations are beneficial to consumers. Their expansion
is not rendered unlawful merely by the fact that small, independent stores may be
adversely affected. It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we
cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection
of viable, small, locally owned business." 370 U.S. at 344. It is submitted that the
hallowed argument as to whether the antitrust laws are intended to protect "competition"
or "competitors" is clearly exemplified by the preceding quotes. The approach of Brown
Shoe appears to be preferable, in that it recognizes that consumers are protected through
the preservation of competitors, while also realizing that the protection of competitors
is not an end in itself.
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substantially lessen competition" within the market. 74 This appears to be
a relatively simple standard. However, the courts have found that its ap-
plication can be a remarkably difficult task.
A number of different measures have been suggested. The strictest yet
simplest interpretation is that which has been proposed by the Government.
In its discussion of this problem the House Report stated that the test
applicable to section 7 was "intended to be similar to those which the courts
have applied in interpreting the same language used in other sections of
the Clayton Act." 7° The Government has used this phrase as the basis for
its contention that Congress intended the rules which have emerged under
Section 3 of the Clayton Act7° to apply to section 7. 77 In Standard Stations"
an extremely strict rule of "quantitative substantiality" was declared to be
the test of illegality in Section 3 cases. 7° Under this rule an exclusive dealing
contract would be illegal if it covered a substantial share of the goods being
sold in the market. Factors other than the size of the market share covered
by the contract would not be relevant. 8 °
The courts have generally refused to accept "quantitative substantiality"
as the sole criterion for measuring competitive effect under section 7. The
test has rather been one which requires the analysis of a large number of
economic factors and determines the competitive consequences of a merger
on the basis of their cumulative effect. 81 In Transamerica Corp. v. Board of
Governors, 82
 which was decided under the old section 7, the Government con-
tended that the standards which had previously been applied to section 7
74 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
76 Supra note 36.
77 "Standard Stations (although not specifically named) was plainly one of the
decisions the House Committee had in mind when a year later it stated that the
standards for judging acquisitions under the amended language of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act 'are intended to be similar to those which the courts have applied in
interpreting the same language as used in other sections of the Clayton Act.' . . . In
sum, as the district court found . . . , Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended in
1950, precludes any acquisition, vertical or horizontal, that to any significant degree
threatens to increase industry concentration or to impair the competitive ability of the
smaller companies in the particular industry." Brief for the United States, pp. 96-97,
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
78 Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). For com-
mentaries see, e.g., Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Competition—The Impact of
Standard Oil CO. of California v. United States on the Standard of Legality Under the
Clayton Act, 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 10 (1949) ; Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic
Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the
Clayton Act, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 913 (1952).
79 "From this decision has come the 'quantitative substantiality doctrine,' a bit
of jargon serving as a badge of membership in the antitrust fraternity, or perhaps--
like Durrell's Justine—as a wearisome turnstile through which we all must presumably
pass. Transplanted into section 7, the quantitative substantiality doctrine would
seemingly imply that any horizontal merger could be struck down on a showing, without
more, that the acquired firm sold a substantial share—perhaps some six to seven percent—
of the goods in the relevant market." Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the
Merging of Law and Economics, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 250 (1960).
80 Supra note 78, at 314.
81 See note 96, infra.
82 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953).
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cases were overruled by Standard Stations. The court rejected this approach,
declaring that:
It necessarily follows that under Section 7, contrary to the rule
under Section 3, the lessening of competition and the tendency to
monopoly must appear from the circumstances of the particular
case and be found as facts before the sanctions of the statute may
be invoked. Evidence of mere size and participation in a sub-
stantial share of the line of business involved, the 'quantitative
substantiality' theory relied on by the Board, is not enough. 83
In Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 84 which was decided under the amended section 7,
the Federal Trade Commission rejected the "quantitative substantiality"
approach and stated that "there must be a case-by-case examination of all
relevant factors in order to ascertain the probable economic consequences." 88
The Pillsbury Mills" approach received the express approval of the Report
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws."
The Report suggests a staggering list of economic factors for possible analysis
by the courts, with the warning that "we do not, of course, imply that all,
several, or any one of these guides may be significant or even relevant in
a given case." 88 Perhaps the most significant addition which the Report
makes to the problem is buried in a footnote. There, in discussing the effect
of Standard Stations on section 7, it was stated that:
We agree that the share of the market actually or prospectively
foreclosed by the merger .can solve some, but not all, Section 7
cases of vertical integration . . . '. We understand the whole Corn-
83 Id. at 170.
84 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953).
85 Id. at 565.
86 Ibid.
87 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws, 120-25 (1955).
88 "Product, geographic, and functional markets identified, it may then become
relevant to examine questions like:
(a) What companies buy or sell in the market, how many, and what are the
significant differences among them: (i) large, medium, and small (market shares, or
rank of large companies, etc.) ; (ii) degrees of vertical integration; (iii) uses of the
product; and (iv) the significance of the product under study in the output or in the
purchases of different companies;
(c) What methods of sales are used in the market: (i) how are the prices of
different sellers related; what of price history; (ii) how free are buyers or sellers to seek
new suppliers or outlets; what determines whether changes will be made?
(d) What are the opportunities for entry of new companies or for expansion of
existing companies into particular product or geographic markets?
(e) What are the opportunities for innovation in products, in techniques, in methods
of sales, etc.?
(f) What types of natural limitations on resources, economies of scale, or special
national policies modify the conditions under which the companies compete?
(g) What is the long-run supply and demand picture and how does it influence
the character of competition?	 ,
All of such facts cannot and need not be investigated in each case; only those
relevant in particular market contexts and obtainable at reasonable cost, should
become a part of the record." Id. at 126.
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mittee to agree that in some cases the fraction of the market from
which competition is eliminated may be large enough to support the
necessary findings under section 7."
The same footnote suggests the application of Standard Stations tests
to horizontal mergers where the market shares involved are sufficiently
large." The duPont-General Motors caseal appears to have taken the ap-
proach suggested by the Attorney General's report. There the Supreme
Court held that duPont's ownership of General Motor's stock was illegal
solely because competitors of duPont might be foreclosed from a substantial
share of the market for automotive fabrics and finishes. Citing Standard
Stations" the Court stated that in order to prove a violation of section 7
"the Government must prove a likelihood that competition may be 'foreclosed
in a substantial share of . . [that market]. "93
 This decision has been
criticized in that the Clayton Act issues were not adequately briefed or
argued since the Government relied principally on proving a Sherman Act
violation." However, this is not wholly convincing. It is much more likely
that the Court felt that "the Clayton Act does not countenance the fourth
largest industrial concern in the United States purchasing a substantial stock
interest in the second largest."05 If duPont-General Motors used section 3
standards only because of the great size of the firms involved, it would be
sui generis and would not be controlling where smaller firms were concerned.
This is the premise which seems to have been impliedly accepted by the
FTC and the lower courts, since in subsequent cases the decisions have
-
nearly always been based on a consideration of a wide range of economic,
factors." In American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co."
89 Id. at 122 n.26.
99 Ibid. "The apparent rejection of Standard Stations in this sentence goes too far,
for we understand the whole Committee to agree that in some cases the fraction of the
market from which competition is eliminated may be large enough to support the
necessary findings under Section 7. This was the case in Standard Stations where the
defendant and other major oil companies were found, by their contract system, to have
denied independant producers of lubricating oil, tires, batteries and gasoline access to
a major share of practically available distributive outlets, and thus to consumers. And
the reasoning of the court in Bennis, which the report approves, was similar, in the
case of a "horizontal" merger, i.e., a combination of competitors."
91 Supra note 55.
92 Id. at 595 n.15.
93 Id. at 595.
94 "The opinion, which preceded the accumulation of any sizeable body of
decisional law under the amended statute, was analyzed at the time by one of the
authors of this article. It was noted that the crux of the Government's attack had
been a broad claim of conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act, and that the section 7
count had been thrown in merely for good measure, that the Clayton Act issues had
not been adequately briefed or argued, and that the court appeared oblivious to the
current of judicial, administrative, and professional opinion opposing application of
quantitative substantiality to mergers." Handler & Robinson, supra note 67, at 677. See
also Mann & Lewyn, supra note 61, at 1079-80.
95
 von Kalinowski, Section 7 and Competitive Effects, 48 Va. L. Rev. 827, 862 (1962).
98
 Sec American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524
(2d Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) ; United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960) ;
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (s.D.N.y. 1958).
97 Supra note 96.
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the Second Circuit returned to the Pillsbury Mills approach, and held that
"the proper test is one of the qualitative substantiality of the resulting effect
on competition in the relevant market."" In United States v. Columbia
Pictures Corp." it was stated that "qualitative measures of the nature of
competition in the market, in addition to a statistical measure of market
share, must be taken into account." 10° Perhaps the most important of these
"qualitative measures" has been the degree of concentration in the industry.
In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.' 01
 the court refused to approve
a merger between Bethlehem Steel Corp. and Youngstown Sheet and Tube
Co. Much stress was placed on the high level of concentration in the steel
industry, and on the increase in concentration which would be the result of
the proposed merger. This, together with the size of the market controlled
by the firms, was sufficient to make out a violation of section 7.
The courts have also given a good deal of attention to the ease with
which new firms may enter the industry, 102
 and have considered a large
number of other factors. But wide searches through large numbers of sup-
posedly relevant factors have met with strong criticism. As one author has
put it, "any proposal to weigh the relevant data in merger cases must
grapple with the fact that little is presently known of the relative importance
of the separate factors involved."'" Economists themselves admit that it is
nearly impossible to safely predict the effect which a given merger will have
on competition within the market.'" As a result, an examination of great
masses of economic data may hinder rather than help the court:
Under these circumstances, there are reasons for suspecting
that a consideration of all relevant factors may actually detract
from the accuracy of decisions made under section 7. This danger
consists in part of the possibility that errors in logic and inference
will increase when large amounts of complex data must be con-
sidered in a conceptual framework that is but partially under-
stood.'"
In Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC 106
 the court showed reluctance to plow
through an extended economic analysis. This case involved a merger between
two competing companies who together accounted for sixty-two and a half
per cent of the production of census coarse paper in eleven western states. 107
In finding a violation of section 7 the court held that: "it is its tendency to
concentration of power that condemns this merger. This alone justified the
Commission's finding that the reasonably probable result of the acquisition
98 Id. at 525.
99 Supra note 96.
100 Id. at 194.
tot Supra note 96.
102 See United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp. supra note 96; American Crystal
Sugar v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd,
259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958). See also von Kalinowski, supra note 95, at 855-57.
103 Bok, supra note 79, at 288.
104 Id. at 246.
105 Id. at 295.
100 Supra note 57.
107 Id. at 807.
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would be substantially to lessen competition and to tend to create a
monopoly." °8
 Perhaps even more important was the court's approach to the
necessity of broad studies of economic factors. Such excursions were found
to make "a case of this kind so appallingly complicated that any judge
might well wonder whether the controversy was really a justiciable one."'"
Although the court did not do so in Crown Zellerbach, it is clear that the
best way to avoid this type of analysis would be to adopt the simpler
standards of section 3. As was pointed out above, 11° this is exactly what the
Supreme Court has done in Brown Shoe. The next question is obvious. Just
what are the standards of illegality under section 3?
The strict tests which Standard Stations applied to section 3 have been
somewhat diluted by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Tampa Electric
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co."' Previous to this case, the courts and the FTC
had whittled away a good deal of the stark simplicity of the Standard Sta-
r tions test by giving consideration to a number of economic factors other than
the size of the market share foreclosed.112
 Tampa Electric involved a re-
quirements contract by which a coal producer agreed to sell a Florida utility
company all the coal which would . be
 required for the operation of a new
generating station for a period of twenty years. In finding that this contract
did not violate section 3 the Supreme Court refused to end the inquiry with
a discussion of market shares. Mr. Justice Clark held that "to determine
substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to weigh the probable effect of
the contract on the relevant area of effective competition, taking into account
the relative strength of the parties, the proportionate volume of commerce
involved in relation to the total amount of commerce in the relevant market
area, and the probable immediate and future effects which pre-emption of
that share of the market might have on effective competition therein." 113
The economic purpose of the agreement and the particular needs of the busi-
ness concerned were also taken into consideration."' Tampa Electric tolls the
knell of "quantitative substantiality." It also makes it clear that an examina-
tion of the effect of the merger on existing competition within the industry
will be extremely important. While retaining the advantages of a limited
economic inquiry, Tampa Electric recognizes the dangers of blindly yielding
to the "runic compulsion" of per se tests.
It is clear that under section 3 the purpose of the agreement will be
108 Id. at 827-28. "Crown, with its leadership in production and sales of the product-
line papers, its great disparity in size as compared with other competitors in the area, and
its position as a price leader in the market, was already in a dominant position before
the merger. Its acquisition of St, Helens could not help but substantially increase that
dominance. It significantly added to its concentration of power." Id. at 827.
101) Ibid.
1 " See text accompanying notes 35-37, supra.
111 365 U.S. 320 (1961), noted in 2 B. C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 442 (1961).
112 See FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953); Maico Co.,
50 F.T.C. 485 (1953) ; Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 50 F.T.C. 681 (1954), aff'd, 217
F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1954); Dictograph Products, Inc. v. FTC, 50 F.T.C. 281 (1953), aff'd,
217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954). For an excellent discussion of standards of illegality under
section 3 see Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and The Problem of Exclusive Arrangements
Under the Clayton Act, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 267 (1961).
1 " Supra note 111, at 329.
114 Id. at 334.
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important. Requirements contracts are treated much more leniently than
tying contracts. 115 This factor was stressed in Brown Shoe when the Court
stated that: "moreover, it is apparent from both past behavior of Brown
and from the testimony of Brown's President, that Brown would use its
ownership of Kinney to force Brown shoes into Kinney stores. Thus, in opera-
tion this vertical arrangement would be quite analogous to one involving a
tying clause." 11{1 One other factor was important in determining the validity
of the vertical Brown-Kinney merger. This was the existence of a trend
toward vertical integration in the industry. The court emphasized that where
such concentration existed, mergers by the larger firms would be illegal even
though very small market shares were involved. 117 In evaluating the hori-
zontal aspects of the merger the Court seems to have based its finding
almost wholly on the basis of the size of the market shares involved. 118
Lip service was paid to other factors which might be considered, but the
size of the market shares occupied by Brown and Kinney in the cities
selected as the geographic markets seems to have been controlling. The
emphasis which the Court placed on choosing standards identical with those
applicable under section 3, combined with its whole hearted reliance on
market shares in condemning the horizontal merger, seems to indicate a
competitive yardstick which comes very close to "quantitative substantiality"
in its implications. However, it is clear that section 7 cases require the same
investigation of "the probable immediate and future effects which pre-
emption of that share of the market might have on effective competition
therein'"H as is required by section 3. In its analysis of the horizontal
aspects of the merger the Court took care to point out that the existence of
a history of concentration in the industry lent additional support to the
finding of the District Court. While discussing the history of concentration
in the industry the Court introduced a relatively new factor. In a footnote
it is inferred that a company which has a history of expansion through
mergers should he more strictly dealt with under section 7 than one which
has grown through internal expansion. 12° This seems to be a rather dubious
conclusion, since a merger by either type of company would appear to have
the same economic impact on competition within the market. In making
this statement the Court appears to be attributing some sort of "anti-
competitive state of mind" to firms with a history of growth through
mergers. It is submitted that this should not be relevant in determining the
competitive effect of mergers. It is difficult enough for courts to perform
the tasks of economic analysis which are presently required of them. A judicial
inquiry into "economic psychology" seems unnecessary.
115
 "Thus, for example, if a particular vertical arrangement, considered under
§ 3, appears to be a limited term exclusive-dealing contract, the market foreclosure
must generally he significantly greater than if the arrangement is a tying contract before
the arrangement will be held to have violated the Act. Compare Tampa Electric Co.
v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, and Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States,
332 U.S. 392." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962).
118 Id. at 332.
117 Id. at 333-34.
118
 Id. at 343-44.
110 Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. supra note 111, at 326.
120 370 U.S. at 345 n. 72.
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In summary, the standards which Brown Shoe used to measure com-
petitive effect under section 7 are substantially those which were used in
Tampa Electric to measure competitive effect under section 3. These are,
first, the size of the market shares involved; second, the economic purpose
of the arrangement; and third, the effect which the pre-emption of these
market shares will have on the "competitive health" of the industry. If
the degree of concentration in an industry is high, even the smallest mergers
by leading firms would seem to be precluded. By attempting to make section
7 definitions of "to substantially lessen competition" conform to those which
have been formulated under section 3, the Court appears to be seeking to
avoid the difficulties inherent in the evaluation of masses of economic data.
Brown Shoe seems to have limited the relevance of such data to information
concerning concentration in the industry, the purpose of the arrangement, and
the size of the market shares involved. If these limitations are adhered to
the task of the courts will be greatly, if not wholly simplified. A test which
considers only the size of market shares is too mechanical. One which relates
this factor to existing competition within the industry provides a frame of
reference which is wide enough to avoid the blind force of per se rules, yet
narrow enough to preclude fruitless judicial inquiries into the "arabesques of
economic theory."121 The Brown Shoe case should lead to judicial acceptance
of the latter approach.
HENRY S. HEALY
121 Bok, supra note 79, at 250. For a well reasoned critique of the "qualitative"
approach see id. at 287-99.
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